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Extraction and Violent 
Resistance in the Early 
Phases of State Building: 
Quantitative Evidence 




Does extraction increase the likelihood of antistate violence in the early 
phases of state-building processes? Although research has focused on 
the impacts of war on state building, the potential “war-making effects” 
of extraction have largely been neglected. The article provides the first 
quantitative analysis of these effects in the context of colonial state building. 
It focuses on the “Maji Maji” rebellion (1905-1907), the most substantial 
incidence of anticolonial violence in Eastern Africa. Analyses based on a 
new historical data set confirm the correlation between extraction and 
resistance. More importantly, they reveal that distinct strategies of extraction 
produced distinct outcomes. Although the intensification of extraction in 
state-held areas created grievances among the population, it did not drive 
the rebellion. Rather, the results indicate that the expansion of extractive 
authority threatened the interests of local elites and provoked effective 
resistance. This finding provides insights into the mechanisms driving the 
“extraction–coercion cycle” of state building.
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Introduction
Violence, extraction, and state building are intrinsically linked (Finer, 1975; 
Herbst, 2000; Tilly, 1990). Numerous empirical studies have investigated 
how war can increase extraction and state capacity more generally (Ames & 
Rapp, 1977; Centeno, 1997; Jaggers, 1992; Thies, 2006, 2007). The potential 
“war-making” effects of extraction, however, have largely been neglected. 
This is surprising. Numerous substantial tax revolts indicate that extraction 
can contribute to antistate violence (Burg, 2004, 2004; Hopcroft, 1999; von 
Trotha, 1994; Young, 1994). From a theoretical perspective, the effects of 
extraction on intrastate war are considered key to the state building “extrac-
tion–coercion cycle”: Resistance against extraction motivates investments in 
administrative and coercive state capacity, whereas increased state capacity 
supports effective extraction that increases the likelihood of antistate resis-
tance (Finer, 1975; Tilly, 1990). This article proposes and tests arguments 
about how extraction can lead to antistate violence.
I base my theoretical arguments and empirical analysis on a broad under-
standing of extraction in line with previous research on state building (e.g., 
Lamborn, 1983; Levi, 1989; Tilly, 1990). For Charles Tilly (1990), extraction 
ranges “from outright plunder to regular tribute to bureaucratized taxation” 
(1990, p. 181). It encompasses a variety of activities and may target a variety 
of resources, ranging from the state’s direct exploitation of raw materials 
(e.g., through state-owned enterprises) to the enactment and enforcement of 
policies, rules, and regulations requiring contributions from the population—
monetary (i.e., taxation) or in kind (e.g., agricultural products, labor). What 
is essential is that activities are being implemented by state actors and/or 
institutions and have the primary purpose of generating economic rents.
States that aim to foster extraction have two principal options. The first 
involves those areas where the state already has a firmly established extrac-
tive authority. It consists of intensifying extraction by increasing the amount 
of taxes, forced labor, or agricultural goods collected from the population. 
This can create economic hardship and result in grievances that can motivate 
rebellion. Alternatively, states may try to expand their extractive authority by 
stripping non-state elites of their extractive capacities and gains. This may 
lead to conflicts between state and non-state actors and trigger resistance 
from local strongmen (Cohen, Brown, & Organski, 1981; Mahmud, De Luca, 
& Vargas, 2012). I argue that the expansion of extraction is substantially 
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more likely to lead to violence than the intensification of extraction because 
it motivates elite participation in rebellion, something that is essential for 
translating grievances into effective mobilization and organizing sustained 
antistate resistance.
The connections between extraction and violence are certainly not deter-
ministic. The effects of extraction are highly contingent on state–society rela-
tions more generally. They depend on the level of political participation, the 
redistribution of state income, and the provision of basic public services. 
Such interaction effects make it difficult to investigate the role of extraction 
in violence. Focusing on a specific instance of state building makes it easier 
to deal with these issues. Redistribution and participation were minimal in 
many colonial states, and state–society relations were more or less confined 
to extraction and repression. Consequently, analyses of colonial state build-
ing allow for a more limited but also more focused and less challenging anal-
ysis of the arguments presented above. I therefore focus my empirical analysis 
on this specific type of state building.
I investigate my argument in the context of the so-called “Maji Maji” 
rebellion in the former colony of German East Africa in the years 1905 to 
1907. The revolt was the greatest uprising in early colonial East and Central 
Africa (Becker, 2004; Koponen, 1995) and engulfed half of the colony’s ter-
ritory, which encompassed today’s Tanzania, Burundi, and Rwanda. Previous 
historical research has emphasized that extraction was essential in driving the 
rebellion. The colonial administration’s activities focused on “coercive 
exploitation” (Tilly, 1990)—that is, the extraction of “tropical” goods needed 
in the metropolis (Bald, 1970; Koponen, 1995). Although it seems plausible 
that the rebellion was related to German extractive practices, no systematic 
quantitative analysis has investigated whether and how extraction actually 
led to violent opposition.
I have collated a comprehensive historical data set, mainly from unpub-
lished historical sources, that features information on various dimensions of 
extraction as well as geocoded violent-event data. The empirical section of the 
article combines district-level comparisons with more fine-grained statistical 
analysis. It exploits the fact that extraction strategies differed substantially for 
the colony’s two principal extractive goods, cotton and rubber. Contrary to 
qualitative accounts of the Maji Maji rebellion, the findings indicate that 
grievances resulting from the intensification of cotton extraction can only 
partly explain the rebellion. Rather, it seems to have been the expansion of 
extraction into the lucrative rubber economy that threatened local elites’ politi-
cal and economic authority and thereby led to widespread antistate violence.
These findings make two main contributions to the literature. First, they 
provide new insights into the mechanisms driving the “extraction–coercion 
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cycle.” The state-building consequences of extraction may be particularly 
strong for specific strategies of extraction associated with specific periods of 
state building. Second, they add to the literature on natural resource extrac-
tion and violence more generally, suggesting that it may not be the degree of 
extraction or state capacity but rather the process of state expansion into 
resource-rich areas that increases the risk of political instability.
Extraction and Violent Resistance
Extraction is a key element of statehood. It represents the vast bulk of state 
activity in the early phases of state building (Mann, 1984; Tilly, 1990). Every 
state’s survival depends on its ability to extract resources that allow it to 
maintain and expand its authority. Extraction is “the central task for the state 
to master before pursuing any other goals” (Levi, 1981; Thies, 2007, p. 717; 
Tilly, 1990). Extractive activities also strongly influence state–population 
interactions. They constitute a fundamental intervention into social life 
(Campbell, 1993). This can provoke opposition, most notably in phases of 
“primitive accumulation of power” (Cohen et al., 1981)—that is, the early 
phases of state building, when “traditional” orders are strong and the state is 
only in the process of expansion and consolidation. Revolts against new taxes 
were frequent in the early phases of European (Burg, 2004; Hopcroft, 1999; 
Lamborn, 1983; Strayer & Taylor, 1939) and colonial state building (Kilson, 
1966; Redding, 2000; Scott, 1977).
But how and when does extraction lead to violence? A first strand of lit-
erature, focusing mainly on taxation, emphasizes that extraction may 
increase the risk of violence because it creates socioeconomic grievances 
among the population. Such grievances may ease mass mobilization and 
constitute the breeding ground for large-scale violent resistance (Gurr, 
1970). For example, Charles Tilly emphasizes that it is the economic burden 
of tax extraction that causes opposition in the state-building and state-mak-
ing processes (Tilly, 1990). In a similar vein, Migdal (1975) and Scott (1977) 
emphasize that extraction is more likely to lead to rebellion if it is particu-
larly rigid and does not leave any economic flexibility to citizens in times of 
economic crisis. Finally, Lamborn (1983) argues that taxation creates griev-
ances and violence if it is not legitimized by beneficial government pro-
grams (see Campbell, 1993).
Another perspective, focusing mainly on natural resources, highlights the 
fact that extraction can increase the risk of violence, as economic rents moti-
vate non-state elites to use violent means to establish and/or defend control 
over resource-rich areas against the state (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; see over-
view in Humphreys, 2005). Mahmud and colleagues (2012) suggest a 
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persuasive theoretical argument according to which resource booms are 
likely to lead to violence if the ownership of resources is not defined a priori. 
Uncertainty and competition between state and non-state actors may incite 
preemptive action and lead to civil war, especially if high stakes associated 
with resource control prevent meaningful negotiation (see also Dube & 
Vargas, 2013).
Building on this literature, I argue that the state’s strategy for increasing 
extraction is of significant importance for the risk of violence as distinct strat-
egies of intensification and expansion exert distinct effects in terms of creat-
ing grievances and competition among state- and non-state elites.
Intensification and Expansion of Extraction
We know that states do not emerge “full blown.” Colonial states are no excep-
tion. Particularly the early phases of colonial state building are marked by 
high levels of unevenness: The state is strong in some pockets (Herbst, 2000; 
Mann, 1984), most notably where colonial explorers, troops, and administra-
tive agents established their initial presence. From here, it evolves in a recur-
rent process of consolidation and enlargement (Levi, 1989). The alternating 
phases of state building are accompanied by associated strategies for maxi-
mizing revenues: the intensification and expansion of extraction.
As part of the process of consolidation, states may intensify extractive 
activities in those areas where they have already been able to establish an 
effective presence and monopolize extraction. Snyder (2006) refers to “pub-
lic extraction” when states fully control the extraction process and the income 
generated by it. In these areas, states may raise additional revenues by 
increasing levels of taxation, implementing additional economic regulations, 
raising tariffs, or fostering natural resource extraction.
Alternatively, parallel to processes of enlargement, states may also further 
expand their extractive authority across their territory. In phases of early state 
building, areas of “public extraction” coexist with areas of “private extrac-
tion” where private economic actors still enjoy exclusive, unregulated, and 
untaxed control over the income generated by resources (Snyder, 2006). The 
expansion of extraction refers to the state’s attempts to bring additional areas 
under state control by replacing preexisting systems of reciprocal rights and 
obligations with its own extractive system—turning “private” extraction into 
“public” extraction.
Following a general argument by Jeffrey Herbst (2000), I assume that the 
alternation between phases of intensification and expansion is driven by 
cost–benefit considerations. Expansion is a costly exercise. Most notably, it 
requires investments to establish institutions for monitoring and ensuring 
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compliance (Levi, 1989). Given the massive resource constraints of most 
colonial states (von Trotha, 1994), such investments are unlikely as long as 
the expected revenue surplus may also be met at a lower cost by intensifying 
extraction in areas already under effective state control. However, the poten-
tial for intensification in a given territory is limited. With every additional 
tax, economic regulation, or drive for forced labor, potential subsequent rev-
enue increases diminish. Decreasing returns increase the strategic value of 
expansion and make a state’s shift from intensification to expansion more 
likely.1
The following section elaborates on the effects of these strategies on the 
population and on competition among the state and non-state elites in line 
with the previous research outlined above.
The Effects of Intensification and Expansion
Both strategies of extraction can create grievances among the population at 
large. The intensification of extraction has especially unequivocal and direct 
economic consequences. Increasing taxation, regulation, and forced labor may 
eventually reach a point where it exceeds people’s economic possibilities and 
undermines subsistence (Migdal, 1988; Scott, 1977). Historical cases seem to 
support the argument that the resulting grievances can directly translate into 
violent resistance. It has been argued that rising taxes threatened local peas-
ants’ livelihoods and motivated peasant rebellions across Europe (Brustein & 
Levi, 1987). Similar effects have been observed in colonial states. In Kenya, 
increasing demand for forced labor eventually exceeded what the local popu-
lation considered acceptable, creating anger that led to violent conflict 
(Brantley, 1981). The introduction of a hut tax in late-19th-century Sierra 
Leone had already caused resentment among the population; the subsequent 
enactment of a per capita tax led to open rebellion (Bursian, 1910).
The economic effects of expansion are less clear. If the expansion targets 
regions without preexisting non-state tributary systems, novel state demands 
do create substantial absolute costs for the respective population—similar to 
the effects of intensification. In other cases, however, state demands may 
simply replace similar tributary claims by non-state elites, without absolute 
economic effects on the population. In either case, however, it may be the 
institutional novelty of expansion that creates grievances. Institutional recon-
figurations may produce socioeconomic change—for example, when the 
expansion introduces new instruments of extraction (e.g., forced labor) or 
enforces adaptations of productive behavior (e.g., introduction of new crops). 
Economic-exchange relations may take a turn for the worse in that people 
may not have to pay more but receive less in return (e.g., Redding, 2000). 
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Although preexisting tributary systems may have rested on specific legiti-
mizing traditions, early state expansion has most often relied on brute force 
(Herbst, 2000; von Trotha, 1994). These changes may create strong antistate 
grievances among the population.
Although these different types of grievances may both be equally condu-
cive to antistate mobilization, I do not assume that any one of them is a suf-
ficient condition for outright rebellion. Peace research strongly suggests that 
grievances will translate into rebellion only if collective action is facilitated 
by influential leaders. As Scott (1977) argues, the difference between every-
day forms of resistance and open conflict may be explained in terms of orga-
nizational and strategic capacities. Elites provide leadership, coordinate 
troops, and ensure internal discipline (Brown, 1997). Thus, effective rebel-
lions require a coalition of local elites and the population to provide for effec-
tive organization of collective action and sufficient participation to ensure 
success (Brustein & Levi, 1987; see also Lamborn, 1983). Consequently, 
extraction is most likely to lead to violence if it contributes to the creation of 
such coalitions by fomenting grievances among the population and by creat-
ing motives for rebellion among influential non-state elites. The following 
paragraphs outline the divergent effects of intensification and extraction on 
non-state elites and elite competition.
Remember that intensification refers to areas where the state already 
monopolizes extraction. In these areas, non-state elites have already been 
(forcefully) deprived of their authority. Thus, control over the extraction pro-
cess is clearly defined a priori, and the economic rents expected via intensifi-
cation do not incite competition between the state and non-state elites 
(Mahmud et al., 2012). Moreover, the disempowerment of non-state elites 
has often been followed by their integration into the state system. In many 
early European and colonial states, the state’s extraction activities relied on 
intermediaries (Levi, 1989). In return for their acceptance of the state’s 
authority, their support for tax collection, and their provision of labor, local 
strongmen received a share of taxes, new rents to distribute, or preferential 
access to economic goods (Lonsdale & Berman, 1979; von Trotha, 1994). 
Thus, once integrated into the state’s extractive system, non-state elites do 
not necessarily suffer from intensified extraction but may actually profit from 
it. This reduces the probability of unified and widespread elite opposition to 
intensification.
Expansion, however, has direct effects on non-state elites. It represents an 
intervention into any preexisting economic relationship and thus threatens 
local elites’ economic gains. Contrary to situations of intensification, control 
over the extraction process and its benefits is contested between the state 
and non-state actors (Mahmud et al., 2012). Brustein and Levi (1987) point 
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out that the state’s introduction of taxation effectively undercut the nobility’s 
power base in 16th- and 17th-century Europe, as it threatened to destroy 
local patron–client relationships. Similarly, in many colonial states, the 
expansion of taxation threatened local elites as they lost their economic ben-
efits (von Trotha, 1994). Submission to the state’s claims was seen by the 
population as the ultimate evidence of obedience to alien authority (Callahan, 
2002; Lonsdale & Berman, 1979). Consequently, expansion is likely to cre-
ate conflict and competition between the state and non-state elites (Mahmud 
et al., 2012). This may motivate preemptive or reactive violence with broad-
based support from local strongmen capable of providing organizational and 
strategic leadership (Brustein & Levi, 1987; Lamborn, 1983; Mahmud et al., 
2012).
Thus, although both strategies of extraction contribute to creating griev-
ances, I expect elite participation and effective mass mobilization to be more 
likely in the context of expansion, leading to higher risks of violence than in 
contexts of intensification. The empirical section of the article aims to inves-
tigate this hypothesis.
The German Colonial State and the Maji Maji 
Rebellion
The German colonial project started as a private enterprise. In 1884, a young 
German named Carl Peters founded the Society for German Colonization 
(which was later renamed the Deutsch Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft [German 
East-African Society], DOAG). Peters had high ambitions: procuring colo-
nies for Germany, improving the international status of the German Reich, 
and securing personal profit. He undertook a series of expeditions through 
East Africa, signing obscure treaties that made local authorities cede their 
land to the DOAG “for all time” (Bückendorf, 1997). Over the years, the 
DOAG expanded its territory and its activities. This process was violently 
interrupted by the so-called “Arab Revolt,” which ravaged the coast of the 
colony in 1888 (Iliffe, 1979). Bismarck intervened on behalf of the DOAG 
and sent a military expedition that crushed the rebellion (Bückendorf, 1997). 
Following this intervention, all administrative functions were transferred 
from the DOAG to the imperial government (Iliffe, 1979).
Extraction by the Colonial State
From the metropolitan state’s perspective, the colony of German East Africa 
primarily served an economic purpose: exploiting and exporting resources 
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that were not available in Germany. In Bismarck’s words, “The winning and 
founding of colonies is nothing more than one expedient for developing 
German economic life” (Bismarck, 1885 as quoted in Koponen, 1995, 
p. 170). Extractive activities focused on maximizing the export of agricul-
tural goods. It was originally planned that production would be ensured 
through large-scale German-led plantations. However, the colonial govern-
ment soon had to recognize that the German output was increasing much more 
slowly than the metropolis had anticipated (Bald, 1970). The colonial state 
administration therefore refocused its strategy on indigenous production.
The main type of extractive activity focused on forcing Africans to pro-
duce cash crops sought by the German administration (Koponen, 1995). 
German “farming inspectors” were to use all necessary means to ensure the 
effective cultivation of crops prioritized by the colonial government 
(Koponen, 1995). Communal production schemes were established, relying 
heavily on short-term forced labor. Taxation was introduced to increase the 
labor supply and induce the production of cash crops: It created the need for 
the population to raise cash by working on plantations or to cultivate products 
accepted by the administration as in-kind tax payment—notably rubber 
(Bursian, 1910). In addition, German extractive activity also aimed at exploit-
ing economic surplus when raw products entered the local markets. Concrete 
activities included the establishment of government-controlled market halls 
(they were mandatory and charged a fee), the introduction of a so-called busi-
ness tax (Gewerbesteuer) on local commercial activities, and an increasing 
number of more decentralized (district-level) economic regulations and price 
controls aimed at strengthening the state’s access to revenues generated in the 
local economy (Bald, 1970).
The Maji Maji Rebellion
Although violence was endemic to the colony, the Maji Maji rebellion repre-
sented a new dimension of resistance, affecting nearly half of the territory. It 
started in August 1905 in the southern Kilwa district and quickly spread to 
the south and the west as well as northward into Dar es Salam. The rebels 
staged numerous substantial attacks on German convoys and stations, often 
with several thousand fighters (Bührer, 2011; Götzen, 1909; Gwassa, 1973; 
Iliffe, 1967, 1979; Nigmann, 1911). Despite its initial successes, the rebellion 
was crushed within less than 2 years. It has been estimated that rebels killed 
15 Europeans and 400 African soldiers, whereas the number of dead among 
rebels and noncombatants is estimated to be between 100,000 and 300,000 
(Iliffe, 1979; Koponen, 1995).
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The causes of the rebellion have been the subject of lively academic 
debate. The first explanation highlights the oppressive and extractive charac-
ter of German colonial rule as well as the hardships and grievances among the 
population (Gwassa, 1973; Iliffe, 2009; Sunseri, 1997). The second explana-
tion stresses the role of a unifying ideology. In 1904, a healer from the 
Matumbi Mountains was said to have been possessed by one of the major 
spirits in the region (Larson, 2010). He distributed medicine that would pre-
vent any harm from German bullets that would turn into water when touching 
combattants skin (“maji,” meaning water in Kiswahili), thereby facilitating 
large-scale resistance (Gwassa, 1973; Iliffe, 1979). The third explanation 
argues that what mattered more were local conflicts among the various ethnic 
groups, which rebelled against the Germans to realize their political and 
material interests (Becker, 2004; Greenstein, 2010; Sunseri, 1997). In the 
remainder of this article, I aim to provide the first quantitative analysis of the 
background of the rebellion, focusing on the role of extraction.
Hypotheses on Extraction and Violence in German 
East Africa
To differentiate between strategies of extraction, I follow Dube and Vargas 
(2013) and de la Sierra (2014) in using the specificities of natural resources 
to investigate the effects of their extraction. Overall, German extraction cen-
tered heavily on cotton and rubber (Bald, 1970; Gwassa, 1973; Koponen, 
1995). The extraction of these goods constituted the backbone of the colonial 
economy. Prior to the rebellion, the German metropolis’ demand for both 
products increased substantially, inciting an actual “resource boom” for both 
products in the colonies. German rubber imports tripled from 1885 to 1905, 
whereas cotton imports—already substantially higher—increased by another 
30% (Koponen, 1995). Consequently, the colonial government greatly ampli-
fied the extraction of both products.
The extraction strategies for each product, however, differed significantly. 
The state fostered cotton production by forcefully increasing agricultural out-
puts in cotton-growing state and settler strongholds along the coast. Rubber 
extraction, however, was promoted by expanding German production and 
regulation from the coast into the vast rubber-growing and trading hinterland 
of the southern districts.2 Consequently, analyzing these goods from a com-
parative perspective allows for insights into how these differences across 
strategies affected the connection between extraction and violence. The fol-
lowing paragraphs provide additional information on the specificities of 
extraction of both products.
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Intensification of Extraction—Cotton Production
The state’s attempts at increasing cotton production followed the logic of 
intensification. Most notably, the extractive drive focused on areas of the 
colony that had already been under firm extractive control of the state 
(Bückendorf, 1997; Bührer, 2011; Pesek, 2005). This was made possible 
because cotton—contrary to rubber (see below)—was cultivated on planta-
tions. Although it required certain climatic conditions, the state administra-
tion and private settlers were rather flexible in terms of selecting the 
geographical location of major production sites. In line with cost–benefit 
arguments suggested above, it was a rational decision to concentrate planta-
tion schemes in areas of strong state presence and established extractive insti-
tutions. More than half of all cotton plantations were concentrated in only six 
coastal districts. These were the areas where the first German stations had 
been established and where the state had already forcefully ended any non-
state extractive activities when it crushed the so-called “Arab Revolt” in 
1888/1889.3 When the rebellion ended, influential non-state elites had either 
been executed or co-opted as state-sponsored intermediaries, the so-called 
“Akida” or “Jumbe.” Thus, when the state started to enforce cotton produc-
tion prior to the Maji Maji rebellion, its activities constituted an intensifica-
tion of a public extractive system established more than 10 years earlier.
There is no doubt that for the population, the intensification of cotton 
extraction brought tremendous human and economic burden. Increasing 
forced labor did not just mean the loss of personal freedom; people had to 
abandon their own agricultural activities, something that led to massive 
socioeconomic hardship for entire villages (Gwassa, 1973). On plantations, 
workers were often at the mercy of brutal German plantation owners. Most 
importantly, from 1902 on, the colonial government introduced numerous 
communal cotton schemes across southern coastal districts. These schemes 
were implemented under the auspices of local intermediaries who were often 
particularly brutal in their extractive activities (Bald, 1970; Klein-Arendt, 
2005; Tetzlaff, 1970). There is ample qualitative evidence that the intensifica-
tion of cotton production actually created widespread grievances against the 
colonial state (Gwassa, 1973; Iliffe, 1967, 2009).
For local elites, however, the consequences of intensification in coastal 
districts were much more ambiguous. As mentioned above, many of them 
were already part of the state system. The most influential “Akida” even 
received a German state salary as precolonial governance had been replaced 
by German rule and administration (Gunzert, 1929; Koponen, 1995). For 
local elites, communal plantation schemes provided new economic opportu-
nities: They were charged with administering the plantations and were 
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allowed to keep a certain share of cotton incomes (Bursian, 1910; Gwassa, 
1973). Consequently, the intensification of extraction did not constitute a 
threat to their political position or economic revenues. Firm state control over 
the extraction process prevented competition between the state and influen-
tial non-state actors. In fact, local elites relied on the German administration 
to uphold their privileged and lucrative position in the cotton economy, and 
they profited from its intensification (Bursian 1910; Gwassa, 1973; Klein-
Arendt, 2005).
To summarize, the intensification of cotton production generated particu-
larly strong socioeconomic grievances but was more ambiguous in terms of 
its effects on non-state elites. In line with the general theoretical arguments 
presented above, I therefore expect that intensified extraction in cotton-pro-
ducing areas was not a primary driver of violence, leading me to my first 
concrete hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The location of cotton-production sites did not determine 
the location of violent events during the Maji Maji rebellion.
Expansion of Extraction—Rubber Production
The state’s attempts at increasing rubber production followed the logic of 
expansion. It targeted the main rubber-growing areas in the hinterlands of the 
Kilwa and Lindi districts. Contrary to cotton cultivation, the colonial admin-
istration was not flexible in selecting production sites for rubber. When the 
“rubber boom” started, Germans were only in the process of experimenting 
with rubber cultivation; until 1910, nearly all of the rubber produced in the 
colony originated from wild vines in the major rubber forests of the southern 
districts (Bald, 1970; Koponen, 1995). Thus, in trying to foster rubber extrac-
tion, the state had no choice but to expand its activities into these areas with 
previously only marginal state presence and extraction. Whereas nine of the 
10 coastal stations had been established before 1890, the first German out-
post in the main rubber-growing region, Donde, was established in 1901 with 
the beginning of the state’s extractive intervention into the area. Thus, when 
the state started to forcefully increase rubber exports around the turn of the 
century, it was introducing new economic demands into these areas rather 
than intensifying ongoing extractive activities.
There is no doubt that the increased presence and activity of the state and 
the introduction of new economic claims brought about socioeconomic 
change and burden. The expansion process, however, had a less pronounced 
economic effect on the population than the intensification of cotton produc-
tion. Many people working in the local rubber economy were already 
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integrated into a non-state extractive system. Local strongmen profiting from 
the rubber boom coerced local rubber collectors by means of financial 
advances on future rubber collection (Becker, 2004; Larson, 2010; Sunseri, 
2009). The German extractive activities focused on taking over of the preex-
isting system. Compared with cotton production, forced labor played a negli-
gible role in the German strategy (Bald, 1970; Koponen, 1995). Increasing 
German control of local rubber markets actually generated some modest 
improvements for many people. Regulations reduced big traders’ leverage, 
and price controls created some transparency for rubber collectors and petty 
traders (Becker, 2004; Krajewski, 2005; Larson, 2010).
The situation was different for local elites. Many had become rich through 
the rubber trade, tributes from caravan traders, the employment of rubber col-
lectors, or their own rubber plantations (Bald, 1970; Monson, 1993; Wright, 
1985). The state’s extraction drive was intended to transfer these non-state 
economic gains to the colonial regime. The extractive activities comprised 
the enactment and enforcement of state-sponsored economic regulations and 
price controls, the introduction of mandatory public market halls, and 
increased taxation. The number of foreign rubber traders increased drasti-
cally from approximately 200 in 1902 to up to 700 in 1905 (Wright, 1985), 
and tax agents followed closely (Larson, 2010; Wright, 1995). These activi-
ties constituted an outright attack on local economic networks and eroded 
“the ability of chiefs to accumulate wealth and attract followers” (Becker, 
2004; Larson, 2010; Sunseri, 2009). Most notably, these big men were influ-
ential enough to potentially mobilize hundreds or thousands of people 
(Becker, 2004; Krajewski, 2005; Larson, 2010; Wright, 1995).
In sum, the expansion of extraction into rubber production may certainly 
have created socioeconomic change and grievances among the population, 
but what was much more pronounced in terms of its negative impacts on local 
elites and the resulting conflicts of interest with the state administration. As 
argued above, I believe that elite alienation in rubber-producing areas was a 
major driving force of the rebellion, leading me to my second concrete 
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The location of rubber-production sites determined the 
location of violent events during the Maji Maji rebellion.
The Role of Taxation in Intensification and Expansion
In addition to the two main agricultural objects of exploitation, I also con-
sider a specific instrument of extraction. As described above, taxation was 
one tool of state extraction, alongside other measures undertaken either to 
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foster agricultural production or to access the profits of local economic-
exchange relations. I pay particular attention to taxation rather than to other 
instruments, because it was perceived by the German administration as par-
ticularly powerful and effective (Bursian, 1910) and because it is easier to 
empirically investigate taxation than to analyze more indirect forms of 
extraction.
The German administration introduced a hut tax in 1898, according to 
which every household had to regularly pay a certain amount to the colonial 
administration (Bursian, 1910). As mentioned above, the tax was explicitly 
not intended as an instrument for revenue generation. Rather, its primary pur-
pose was to increase the local labor supply for agricultural production. This 
specific purpose of the tax also led to a specific pattern of implementation: 
The tax was focused on regions with a high concentration of prioritized agri-
cultural goods. Consequently, taxation accompanied both the intensification 
and the expansion of extraction in cotton- and rubber-producing areas, 
respectively (Bursian, 1910); tax incomes were highest in rubber- and cotton-
producing districts (Becker, 2004; Koponen, 1995; Larson, 2010).
As taxation was used as an instrument of extraction in both cotton- and 
rubber-producing areas, investigating the main effects of taxation on violence 
would not add much information about the varying effects of expansion and 
intensification. If I identified the expected association between taxation and 
violence, we still would not know whether this effect was driven by factors 
associated with expansion or by factors associated with intensification. 
Analyzing the conditional effects of taxation, is more promising. Assuming 
that taxation is a valid proxy for the levels of extraction (i.e., it correlates with 
other instruments such as regulations and price controls), the geographical 
variation in taxation within individual agricultural sectors (cotton and rubber) 
should indicate how much the state pushed extraction across various cotton- 
and rubber-producing areas.
In line with the hypothesis presented above, I expect that high levels of 
taxation represented a threat to non-state elites in rubber-producing areas and 
should therefore be associated with a higher risk of violence in rubber-grow-
ing areas than in other parts of the colony. In cotton-producing areas, how-
ever, taxes primarily represented a burden for the population, while creating 
some economic opportunity for local intermediaries. Consequently, I do not 
expect taxation to be more conducive to violence in cotton-producing areas 
than in other regions. This leads me to my third and final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The association between the level of taxation and violence 
has been particularly strong in rubber-producing areas whereas there was 
no similar interactive effect in cotton-producing areas.
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Empirical Strategy, Data, and Results
The research design combines two levels of analysis. Given the high spatial 
concentration of the rebellion in the southern regions, I first compare the 22 
districts of the colony to see whether rebellious districts differed from the 
others in any systematic way. Next, I investigate extraction and violence on a 
more disaggregated level. The following subsections introduce the data and 
present the results of the district-level comparisons and the quantitative 
analysis.
Colonial Data
All the analyses presented below are based on a newly compiled historical 
data set. It draws on three main sources, which are briefly outlined below 
(more detailed information on individual historical data as well as on how 
they have been processed is presented in the online appendix).
The first is the yearly reports of the German Imperial Colonial Office, 
which include substantive statistical annexes on the colonies. These reports 
are a rich source of information and include detailed numbers regarding state 
personnel or the activities of missionary societies. Most notably, I draw on 
the 1904/1905 yearly report for information on tax incomes per districts/
German stations prior to the beginning of the rebellion (1904).
The second source is a number of thematic maps produced by the colonial 
government as well as various private colonial and missionary societies. 
These maps display the locations of military and missionary stations, the bor-
ders of the colony’s districts, and the locations of various plantations and of 
roads and caravan routes. The “Economic Atlas of the German Colonies” 
(Wirtschaftsatlas der Deutschen Kolonien) was particularly useful for the 
measurement of the main explanatory variables. The atlas was prepared by an 
influential German nongovernmental organization that aimed to support the 
economic development of German colonies (Kolonialwirtschaftliches 
Kommittee). The atlas includes comprehensive economic maps, with detailed 
geographical information on the exact location of the major production sites 
of all economically relevant natural resources and agricultural products in 
German East Africa. Most notably, I use information on the major rubber- 
and cotton-production sites provided in the economic map published in 1906.
Finally, the third source, which was used to obtain information on the 
location of violence, is the weekly issues of the German East African 
Newspaper (Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Zeitung, DOAZ) for the period under 
investigation. The DOAZ was edited in Dar es Salam. From 1905 on, it fea-
tured a special section called “News from the areas of disturbances,” which 
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contained information on clashes in the rebellious districts. To obtain a pre-
cise idea of the geographical distribution of violence during the rebellion, I 
have created a newspaper-based geolocated event data set and have geolo-
cated a total of 231 events. Figure 1 displays the distribution of violent events 
per district and per grid cell (see empirical analysis below).
Taken together, these data provide unique insights into the German colonial 
state and the Maji Maji uprising. The fact, however, that these data stem from 
a highly autocratic regime and are more than 100 years old may raise doubts 
regarding their accuracy. For example, the DOAZ may have underreported 
violence so as to play down the extent of the rebellion. Officials may have had 
incentives to under- or over-report on some issues. Although I cannot rule out 
the possibility that some of the data are inaccurate, there are nevertheless good 
reasons to assume that they allow for meaningful analysis.
First, the DOAZ was in fact very critical of the colonial government. It was 
shut down twice—once because it printed a report on Governor von 
Rechenberg’s alleged intimate relations with one of his servants (Schmidt, 
2008). It certainly underreported interethnic clashes. This, however, does not 
jeopardize my analysis: I intentionally focus on violence against the state and 
not on factional fighting.
Second, most of the information used in this article was either militarily 
important to the German government, thus creating incentives for accurate 
reporting (for example, road networks), or difficult to manipulate (for instance, 
the tax income had to be transferred into the German budget). In other cases, 
it is hard to think of reasons that colonial staff would have manipulated the 
data—for example, on the location of rubber forests or cotton plantations.
Finally, colonial agents were eagerly trying to provide as detailed and as 
accurate maps of the colony as possible (Hafeneder, 2008). Comparisons of 
Figure 1. Violent events, 1905-1906, per district and per grid cell.
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historical georeferenced maps with current national boundaries demonstrate 
that these attempts were quite successful. To account for any remaining geo-
graphical inaccuracies, the data set uses a comparably crude scale, with 50 
km × 50 km grid cells as the smallest units of analysis.
District-Level Comparisons
I begin with simple district-level visual inspections and statistical tests. These 
analyses are not meant to provide any causal claims. Their objective is to 
investigate whether the strong north–south divide of the rebellion coincides 
with patterns of extraction and variations in extractive goods and strategies. 
Such district-level associations provide for an initial assessment of the plau-
sibility of the hypotheses and are a helpful frame of reference for interpreting 
the more systematic quantitative analysis presented below.
Figure 2 illustrates the geographical distribution of some features of the 
colonial state. In each figure, the different shades represent quartiles that 
divide the districts into four equal groups according to the values of the 
respective indicators. The darker shades represent higher values. Each map is 
assigned the coefficient of the respective indicator’s correlation with the 
number of violent events as well as the measure of statistical significance for 
this association (Spearman rank correlation coefficients).
I use three different proxies from the sources described above—namely, 
(a) the total value of taxes collected per district in the year prior to the upris-
ing, (b) the number of rubber sites per district size, and (c) the number of 
cotton plantations per district size.4 A look at the spatial distribution of the 
first two variables indicates that tax incomes were particularly high and rub-
ber forests particularly frequent in the southern districts where violence 
erupted in 1905. The number of cotton plantations, however, is only weakly 
correlated with violence. If we look at similar plots for a number of other 
characteristics of the colonial state—such as the number of missionaries, the 
number of security personnel, the accessibility in terms of road length, or the 
overall number of Germans (all per district size)—we see that none displays 
a comparable correlation with the spatial variation of violence during the 
uprising.
One has to be cautious in drawing conclusions from these rather crude 
district-level comparisons. Nonetheless, this initial exploratory analysis of 
district-level data seems to lend some support to the proposition that eco-
nomic narratives were behind the uprising, as mentioned above. Most impor-
tantly, the variation between the findings for cotton and for rubber lends 
support to the argument that the specificities of rubber extraction made it a 
more conflictual process than cotton extraction.
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Cross-Sectional Analysis
Districts were the only meaningful and formalized administrative units of the 
German colonial state. As they were not subdivided into more numerous 
second-tier units that would allow for statistical analyses on a more disag-
gregated level, I have created an artificial grid comprising 450 50 km × 50 
km cells covering the colony’s territory. The size of the cells mirrors the 
objective of providing a sufficient number of cases for meaningful statistical 
analysis while taking into account the potential imprecisions resulting from 
colonial maps. The horizontal and vertical outer boundaries of the grid-net 
have been defined randomly.
Figure 2. District-level comparisons.
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For the main models, I have created a binary “occurrence of violence” 
variable that has the value “1” if at least one violent event took place within 
a cell’s boundaries during the Maji Maji rebellion of 1905-1907.5 The indica-
tors for levels of extraction correspond to the district-level comparisons: I use 
the number of cotton plantations and rubber forests per grid cell. Colonial 
statistical reports provide information on the absolute value of taxes collected 
by each of the German stations. Tax collection was mainly confined to areas 
easy to reach from German stations (Pesek, 2005). Consequently, the levels 
of taxation varied substantially according to distance from stations, rather 
than population size. To proxy for tax burden per grid cell, I use the tax rev-
enue of the nearest German station responsible for the respective area accord-
ing to the administrative setup of the territory (meaning that the cells’ 
centroids and the German station have to be within the same district), 
weighted by the geographical distance from the grid cell’s centroid to the 
station.6 I have log-transformed the quotient to account for excessive varia-
tion in distances and increase normality of the left-skewed variable.
I also consider a number of control variables in the statistical analysis. The 
first one is the number of Germans per cell. In addition, I consider the approx-
imate locations of previous phases of violence (I use a dummy variable that 
has the value “1” for all grid cells that had previously seen violent clashes 
with the colonial state according to Nigmann, 1911). Roads may have eased 
the deployment of troops and increased military action in areas connected to 
road networks (Herbst, 2000). The respective control variable is the length of 
all roads within the grid cells. Missions ran stations and schools across the 
colony. For each grid cell, I consider the number of baptisms in the nearest 
missionary station, weighted by the distance to the station (log-transformed). 
It may be possible that the likelihood of violence is affected by the duration 
of continuous state presence in a specific region. I use information on the date 
of the establishment of every German station that existed in 1905 to calculate 
the number of years it had been present when the rebellion began. Finally, I 
consider the number of security personnel per nearest station, weighted by 
the distance and log-transformed.7
Table 1 presents the results of simple logistic regressions with standard 
errors clustered by district to account for serial correlation and heteroscedas-
ticity.8 The results indicate a highly significant positive correlation between 
tax extraction and the likelihood of violence. There is only a weak correlation 
between cotton extraction and violence. This association wanes in the full 
model, which considers all three variables of extraction. Models 3 and 4 indi-
cate a significant correlation between rubber extraction and violence.
Table 2 displays the results of conditional fixed-effects logistic regression, 
controlling for differences across the colony’s 22 districts.9 The findings 
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mirror those outlined above. The indicators for taxation and rubber extraction 
are significantly correlated with the outcome variable, whereas there is no 
indication of a significant role of cotton extraction in this more conservative 
model specification.
Due to the nonlinear nature of the model specifications, we cannot judge 
the substantive significance of the associations. I therefore estimate the pre-
dicted probabilities of violence occurrence as a function of extraction. Holding 
all other variables at their respective means and moving from the minimum to 
the maximum level of tax extraction increase the likelihood of violence from 
Table 1. Logit Models (Without Fixed Effects)—Extraction and Violence.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
German pop −0.025* −0.015 −0.004 −0.021*
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.008) (0.013)
Station/years −0.055 −0.033 −0.028 −0.065
 (0.068) (0.063) (0.064) (0.065)
Prev violence −0.223 0.059 0.169 −0.226
 (0.539) (0.531) (0.524) (0.541)
Road length 1.044*** 1.687*** 1.880*** 1.025***
 (0.400) (0.347) (0.356) (0.383)
Military/dist (ln) −0.241 −0.252 −0.186 −0.208
 (0.248) (0.380) (0.379) (0.265)
Mission/dist (ln) −0.310 −0.328 −0.415 −0.396*









Constant −9.734*** −0.650 −1.213 −9.558***
 (1.964) (1.289) (1.313) (1.804)
  
Observations 437 437 437 437
AIC 292.268 342.294 327.057 278.765
BIC 324.908 374.933 359.696 319.564
Log likelihood −138.134 −163.147 −155.528 −129.382
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. AIC = Akaike information criterion; BIC = Bayesian 
information criterion.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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0% to more than 70%. The simulated effect of rubber extraction is compara-
ble, with a difference of approximately 55% in the likelihood of violence 
between the minimum and the maximum level of rubber extraction.
Next, I turn to my third hypothesis on the conditional effects of taxation. In 
line with the general arguments presented above, we should expect a positive 
interaction effect for taxation and rubber, whereas we should not find any simi-
lar effects for cotton. Results are weaker for the interaction than for the main 
effects10 but mirror the expected associations: Higher levels of taxation are 
more harmful in areas with particularly lucrative rubber reserves—apparently, 
the state’s extractive drive into these regions represented a particularly substan-
tial threat to non-state elites’ economic interests.
Table 2. Logit Models (With Fixed Effects)—Extraction and Violence.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
German pop −0.007 −0.005 −0.004 −0.005
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Station/years 0.167** 0.151** 0.153** 0.166**
 (0.079) (0.074) (0.073) (0.084)
Prev violence 0.087 0.117 0.142 0.029
 (0.450) (0.450) (0.459) (0.469)
Road length 0.839 0.921 0.950 0.819
 (0.689) (0.678) (0.687) (0.715)
Military/dist (ln) −0.206 0.200 0.219 −0.282
 (0.386) (0.259) (0.264) (0.421)
Mission/dist (ln) −0.201 −0.253 −0.195 −0.330










Observations 183 183 183 183
AIC 165.157 166.120 161.977 160.568
BIC 187.623 188.586 184.443 189.454
Log likelihood −75.579 −76.060 −73.988 −71.284
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. AIC = Akaike information criterion; BIC = Bayesian 
information criterion.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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Figure 3 illustrates the interaction effect. In general terms, the figure 
reflects the strong individual effect of taxation on the risk of violence. More 
importantly, it shows that similar levels of taxation were substantially more 
conducive to violence in areas of high rubber reserves as compared with 
other regions of the colony. Or interpreted the other way around, similar lev-
els of taxation created more substantial risks of violence in rubber-producing 
areas.
These results lend support to the article’s main hypotheses. Even more so 
as they clearly mirror the findings from the district comparisons—not only in 
terms of the general correlation between the indicators for extraction and 
violence but also with respect to the divergent findings for rubber on the one 
hand and cotton extraction on the other.
Robustness Checks
This section briefly summarizes the main findings of additional analyses 
intended to further scrutinize the main correlations presented above, focusing 
on the role of ethnicity, an instrumental variables approach, and auxiliary 
estimations that aim to narrow down the mechanisms linking the expansion 
of extraction to violence.
The Role of Ethnic Groups
The district-level fixed effects included in the main models implicitly control 
for district-level variations in ethnic composition. Considering, however, that 
previous qualitative analyses have emphasized that participation in the rebel-
lion varied across ethnic groups, I estimate additional models with explicit 
ethnic controls.
Figure 3. Predictive margins—Interaction of rubber and taxation.
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I rely on information on precolonial ethnic organization from Murdock 
(1967), Gennaioli and Rainer (2007), and Nunn (2008). Murdock provides 
detailed information on various precolonial characteristics of African ethnic 
groups, georeferenced by Nunn (2008). I have estimated the main models 
with ethnic-group fixed effects. This does not substantially affect the main 
associations found between cotton, rubber, and violence. Taxation, however, 
seems to be sensitive to ethnic controls. The interaction of taxation with rub-
ber has the right sign but is not statistically significant; the interaction with 
cotton turns weakly statistically significant but is negative (see Tables 13 and 
14 in the online appendix).
This variation of results may be a consequence of the massively reduced 
sample size. Two thirds of the observations are dropped when ethnic-group 
dummy variables are included in the models (reducing the number of obser-
vations in the district-level fixed-effects models by another 25%). If I con-
sider individual ethnic characteristics deemed particularly relevant in terms 
of capacity for mobilization (the degree of ethnic centralization and settle-
ment patterns) rather than actual ethnic-group fixed effects, the findings mir-
ror the results of the main models presented above (see Tables 15 and 16 of 
the online appendix).11 These results increase my confidence that the associa-
tions presented above have not been driven by differences across ethnic 
groups.
Instrumental Variable Approach
It is unlikely that violence during the Maji Maji rebellion influenced levels of 
rubber extraction before the rebellion. Nonetheless, potential endogeneity 
issues cannot be ruled out in the multivariate regressions presented above. 
Moreover, although the main models control for a number of theoretically 
relevant factors, the results may still be biased due to other unobserved vari-
ables. As a second robustness check, I have estimated two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) models that exploit exogenous variation, induced by an instrumental 
variable (for example, Imbens and Angrist, 1994).
The geographical distribution of wild rubber vines is driven by exogenous 
climatic and soil conditions. Landolphia kirkii, the rubber species most prev-
alent in the former German East Africa, grows best in hot and humid areas 
with low elevation and sandy soils (Ehrhardt, 1903; Schnee, 1920; Sethuraj 
& Mathew, 1992). I have created a simple additive index using data on eleva-
tion from the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM; elevation below 
500 m), information on climatic conditions from a study on rainfall and tem-
perature in German East Africa (Marner, 1940; “very hot and humid” 
regions), and data on soil properties from the European Soil Portal for Africa 
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(minimum 50% sand in soil). Given these arbitrary thresholds as well as the 
additive character and composition of the index, it is unlikely that the index 
affects the risk of violence through causal channels other than the presence of 
rubber vines. Most notably, neither individual components nor the index 
itself is correlated with German settlement patterns. The first-stage regres-
sion presented in the online appendix shows that the instrument is a statisti-
cally significant predictor of the presence of rubber. Second-stage estimations 
confirm the previous findings on the positive association between rubber 
extraction and violence (see Tables 17 and 18 in the online appendix).12
The Role of Change and the Role of Elites in the Expansion of 
Extraction
As argued above, the expansion of extraction differs from its intensification 
in two main respects. First, expansion is associated with entirely novel 
demands and socioeconomic change. Second, it is likely to exert more sub-
stantial negative effects on local non-state elites. Observable differences 
between the effects of rubber and cotton extraction may therefore be a conse-
quence of either of these two specificities. The following paragraphs aim to 
provide some empirical evidence in support of my theoretical claim that 
threats to the non-state elites were decisive.
Political and economic power in rubber-producing regions was dependent 
on having control over the main trading routes (Becker, 2004). Consequently, 
“big men” resided close to the traditional caravan routes (Larson, 2010). If 
the argument about the effects of expanded rubber extraction on local elites 
holds, we would expect violence to be particularly likely in rubber-growing 
areas along these routes. If, however, expansion was related to rebellion due 
to the novelty of the state’s economic demands, there would be no reason to 
expect such an association. I have identified the route locations with a map 
published in 1892 and interacted the distance to the nearest trading route with 
the number of rubber forests per grid cell. As expected, the interaction term 
is negative and statistically significant in models with and without fixed 
effects (see Table 19 in the online appendix). Thus, among regions subject to 
the expansion of extraction, those areas that were likely controlled by influ-
ential non-state elites saw the strongest association between rubber produc-
tion and violent resistance.
Next, I look at the internal organization of the rebellion. If the expansion 
of rubber extraction led to violence because it threatened southern strong-
men, events requiring particular organizational resources should also have 
been more frequent in rubber-producing areas. If, however, expansion was 
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associated with violence because of the specific grievances that novel eco-
nomic demands created among the population at large, we would not neces-
sarily expect a higher degree of centralized organization in rubber-growing 
regions. I extract information from the violent-event data set about events 
that reportedly involved more than 1,000 rebel fighters or that constituted an 
organized attack on German missionary or military stations. The latter dis-
played patterns of military strategy that required centralized and strategic 
planning (Bührer, 2011; Gwassa, 1973). I have reestimated the main models 
with this alternative outcome variable and have found that the occurrence of 
large-scale events was more likely in rubber-growing areas. In the full model 
with fixed effects, only rubber is associated with the occurrence of these 
events at conventional levels of statistical significance (see Table 20 in the 
online appendix).
These two auxiliary analyses are certainly not “hard tests” that would 
allow for strong confirmation of a causal relationship between threats to the 
vested interests of local elites and the occurrence of violence. They are, how-
ever, much more in line with this specific causal mechanism than the coun-
terargument that the expansion of extraction increased the risk of violence 
because of the specific grievances it created among the population at large.
Conclusion
This article has presented an initial quantitative analysis of the connection 
between extraction and violent anticolonial resistance. Overall, the findings 
lend support to the argument that distinct strategies of extraction produce 
distinct outcomes in terms of violent antistate rebellion in the early phases of 
state building.
German attempts to increase cotton production and trade were mainly 
based on an intensification strategy with strong negative effects on the popu-
lation (Bald, 1970; Koponen, 1995; Sunseri, 1997). However, as has been 
noted elsewhere, brutal extraction was a feature of the colonial state across 
most areas of the colony, not just in the cotton-growing districts (Becker, 
2004; Tambila, 1981). The expansion of extraction into rubber-growing 
areas, however, threatened the vested interests of influential local elites and 
created resentment among local “big men” able to draw thousands of people 
into violent conflict (Becker, 2004; Krajewski, 2005; Larson, 2010; Wright, 
1995). The qualitative evidence underscores the fact that such elites actually 
played a crucial role in mobilizing fighters, coordinating rebel troops, and 
planning large-scale attacks (Gwassa, 1973).
Certainly, the study is limited in that it focuses on one specific instance of 
antistate violence only. Replications in other contexts are needed to 
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corroborate the results. Nonetheless, the findings from this single case study 
may have important theoretical implications for two research strands.
First, they inform our understanding of long-term state-building pro-
cesses. As the state consolidates territorial control, opportunities for the fur-
ther expansion of extractive authority decrease while the process of 
extractive monopolization provides additional prospects for the intensifica-
tion of extraction. If the former is substantially more likely to lead to vio-
lence than the latter, the dynamics of the “extraction–coercion cycle” may 
change over time. Most notably, we would expect increasingly strong asso-
ciations between extraction and violence, up to a tipping point. From here 
on, the intensification of extraction promises greater economic gains than 
the expansion of extraction, which means weaker associations between 
extraction and violence. From this point on, the “extraction–coercion cycle” 
should slow down, reducing the violence-producing and state-building 
effects of further extraction.
I do not possess the data needed to investigate such potential long-term 
implications. Moreover, the extraction–coercion cycle is certainly strongly 
affected by simultaneous economic, social, and political developments. It 
is nonetheless interesting to look at longer term changes in the absolute 
numbers of a specific type of extraction-related conflict. Burg lists hun-
dreds of instances of protest and rebellion related to taxation (Burg, 2004). 
The list is certainly not exhaustive. Moreover, we do not know whether 
temporal trends signify specific developments in tax-related violence or 
mirror more general conflict trends. Still, Figure 4 indicates that it may be 
worthwhile to investigate these arguments further. We see that the devel-
opment of absolute numbers of tax rebellions in Europe corresponds to 
what one would expect from cyclical developments, with phases of signifi-
cant tax-related violence followed by phases of limited violence. Moreover, 
Figure 4. Number of major tax rebellions in Europe according to Burg (2004).
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as suggested above, these developments seem to flatten following a peak 
in the first half of the 16th century. Further analysis of single cases as well 
as long-term qualitative and quantitative analysis may provide additional 
evidence that confirms or challenges the hypotheses presented in this 
article.
Second, insights from colonial times may contribute to the development 
of hypotheses on the effects of natural resource extraction under contempo-
rary conditions of weak statehood. Numerous previous studies have empha-
sized that state institutions play a crucial role when it comes to associations 
between natural resource extraction and intrastate violence. They show that 
the capacity, the quality, and the democratic nature of institutions matter (e.g., 
Basedau & Richter, 2014; Snyder, 2006; Snyder & Bhavnani, 2005). The 
findings presented in this article underscore the possibility that another factor 
may also be relevant: trends of state expansion into resource-extraction areas 
and the associated effects on the economic and political interests of local 
elites (Mahmud et al., 2012; Snyder, 2006). From such a perspective, abun-
dance and high levels of extraction per se may not increase the risk of vio-
lence if the respective regions are not targeted by the state for the expansion 
of extraction or if they have already been brought under effective state con-
trol. Empirical studies may, for example, investigate whether increased state 
penetration into resource-rich remote areas has contributed to violence in 
places such as Indonesia or the Democratic Republic of Congo, where long 
distances from political centers to resource-rich areas were favorable to the 
creation of non-state extractive systems that were later targeted by states’ 
expansion of extraction.
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Notes
 1. The alternation between intensification and expansion is certainly driven not 
only by time and decreasing returns. Changing market prices for resources or 
the identification of new resources may motivate strategic reorientations. Both 
strategies may also be followed simultaneously: States can increase extraction in 
one area and at the same time expand extraction into others.
 2. Certainly, cotton extraction was not only intensified but also expanded into new 
areas to some degree. Similarly, some rubber-growing areas had already been 
under effective state control prior to the rebellion. Nonetheless, historical evi-
dence suggests substantial qualitative differences in terms of the main extractive 
strategies for each product and the associated impacts on the population and 
local elites as outlined above.
 3. This early uprising has been traced back to local elites’ resistance to the introduc-
tion of tariffs, a myriad of new taxes and measures to bring land and traditional 
caravan routes under the state’s control (Bückendorf, 1997; Bührer, 2011). In the 
light of the theoretical arguments suggested in this article, the revolt may there-
fore be interpreted as a violent reaction against initial processes of expansion in 
the earliest phase of colonialization.
 4. Normalizing variables per population size rather than per geographical size of 
districts would be conceptually more convincing. The bivariate correlations 
between cotton, rubber, and taxes normalized by estimated population size in 
1904 correspond to the correlations presented above. The results are not pre-
sented here, as I doubt the reliability of the population numbers provided in 
German statistical reports: Numbers vary substantially across years, indicat-
ing that administrators repeatedly corrected their estimates (results available on 
request).
 5. I have also made use of an alternative measurement for violence. Nigmann 
(1911) provides information on the location of major clashes involving German 
troops. I have geolocated these events for the period of the Maji Maji rebellion, 
creating a measure of violence that is independent from the newspaper reports. 
The results of estimations with this alternative measure correspond to the main 
results presented below (see Tables 4 and 5 in the online appendix).
 6. I have georeferenced maps from the so-called Military Orientation Book for 
German East Africa, prepared by the German military in 1911. It contains 
detailed maps that display thousands of individual road sections, including infor-
mation on travel time. I have measured the length of 100 straight lines with a 
minimum distance of 25 kilometers and compared distances with travel times as 
indicated on the maps. The correlation is .95, which indicates that the distances 
correspond to travel time for the scaling used in this study.
 7. The main models include controls that have been emphasized in previous quali-
tative analyses of the Maji Maji rebellion. I have also estimated models with 
additional controls emphasized in more general research on violent conflicts: 
population density, precipitation, and the location of caravan route junctures (as 
proxies for economic development in terms of agriculture and trade). Tables 6 
and 7 of the online appendix present the results of these models.
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 8. Alternatively, I have estimated a rare events logit model, an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) model on the log-transformed count variable with and without 
fixed effects, and a negative binomial regression on the count variable—again, 
with and without fixed effects. The findings correspond to those of the main 
models (see Tables 8, 9, and 10 in the online appendix).
 9. To account for potential spatial clustering below the district level, I have esti-
mated additional models that control for a spatial lag of the outcome variable. 
All the findings correspond to those of the main models (see Tables 11 and 12 in 
the online appendix).
10. Correlations are statistically significant only in models without fixed effects, and 
they are more sensitive to changes of model specifications (detailed results in 
Table 3 of the online appendix; robustness checks in Tables 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 
and 16).
11. I use an index of political centralization, measured as the number of jurisdic-
tional hierarchies beyond the local level, originally constructed by Gennaioli and 
Rainer (2007).
12. The Kleibergen–Paap Wald F statistics are above the critical values of relative 
bias suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005). As I have used only one instrument, it 
has been impossible to test for exogeneity using Hansen J statistics. I have there-
fore also run an additional 2SLS model, including a dummy for the presence of 
rivers, as wild vines supposedly grow near running water (National Research 
Council, 2008). Hansen J statistics indicate that we cannot reject the null hypoth-
esis of exogenous instruments. The second-stage model confirms the correla-
tions found in previous models.
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